




times, depending on certain technical fea-
tures ofthe Fed's efforts to control money.
Specifically, lagged accounting creates a
majorproblemonlywhen reserves borrowed
from the Federal Reserve are nearly at zero
levels, and when the Fed wishes to focus its
monetary-control procedures on bank re-
serves. The problem is that the Fed may find
it necessary to control money by setting
Federal-funds rate targets-the method it
abandoned lastOctoberin favor ofareserves
method.
Reserves operating procedures
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve
Under lagged accounting, any increases in
deposits this week forced banks to obtain
more reserves two weeks later. Furthermore,
an increase in this week's funds rate often
indicated that the funds rate two weeks later
would be similarly high. The higherexpected
funds rate induced balance-sheet reactions of
individual banks that led to slower growth in
system-wide deposits, and thus in M-1 B.
Demand-deposit growth was also reduced
as the funds-rate increase spread to other
money-market yields, reducing the public's
demand for deposits. Since this process
would have been virtually identical under
contemporaneous accounting, the choice of
reserve accounting rules was oflittle con-
sequence underthe former funds-rate
procedure.
Funds-rate operating procedures
The Fed can influence money growth in
either oftwo basic ways-bytargeting the
quantity of reserves it supplies to the banking
system or bytargeting the Federal-funds rate,
the interest rate at which banks borrow re-
serves from each other and from other insti-
tutions. Prior to October 6, 1979, the Fed
used the latter method. When it wanted
slower monetary growth, the Fed raised the
funds rate, making reserves more expensive
for banks to obtain.
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Is the choice between lagged and contem-
poraneous accounting,really all that impor-
tant? After all, amatter'ofonlytwo weeks is
involved. Indeed, some analysts maintain
that atwo-week lag can only insignificantly
influence the decisions ofindividual banks,
which are based upon longer-run consider-
ations. In this view, the choice between re-
serve accounting rules plays only aminor
role in how the money stock is determined.
Ouranalysis suggests, however, that both
sides ofthis debate are correct at various
Two Weeks Can Be a long Time
Many observers, including Milton Friedman
in his Newsweek column, are currently sug-
gesting that the Fed should switch from the
lagged system back to the contemporaneous
rule. They arguethatthisaction would signif-
icantly improve Federal Reserve control over
the monetary aggregates. These arguments
took on new urgency this spring, when sev-
eral key policy aggregates declined at atime
when the economy was moving into areces-
sion. (The narrow M-1 Bmeasure-currency
plus bankdemand deposits plusothercheck-
type deposits-declined at a7.7-percent rate
over April and May.) The rule thus has be-
come an important policy issue, in view of
the argument that lagged accounting ham-
pers efforts to push the monetary aggregates
back up intotheir target ranges.
Lagged reserve accounting is one ofthe most
arcane, yet frequently debated monetary-
policy issues ofthe past decade. On its face,
this regulation-part ofFederal Reserve Reg-
ulation D-appearsto besimpleand innocu-
ous. It states that, in any given week, Federal
Reserve member banks musthold reserves (in
the form ofdeposits ataFederal Reserve Bank
or vault cash) in prescribed percentages of
their various types ofdeposits outstanding
twoweeks earlier. This rule has been in effect
since 1968, replacing the system ofcontem-
poraneous reserve accounting, which re-




~©:\Jill lFlT@\Jill«:n~«:~1F~dl~JJ' @ill l1«~~~JJ'w~
]ED@iEldk ~)~
§@i1l'0. 1FJJ'@ill'l1(\;li~(\; CSJ)
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not
necessarily reflect the views of the management
of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco"
nor 01 the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System,
announCEid that it wouId place a greater
emphasis in the day-to-day control ofthe
monetary aggregates on the quantityofbank
reserves, and allow greater short-run fluc-
tuations in the funds rate (see the October 19,
1979 Weekly Letter-"The Fed Crosses the
Rubicon"), The Fed took this action because
the funds-rate approach to monetary control
had notworked as well as was desirable or
possible, Butthese effortstotighten monetary
control had another effect closer to the cur-
rent discussion-the choice between lagged
and contemporaneous accounting became
an important monetary-policy issue,
To see this point, we must understand the
basic elements ofcontrolling money through
reserves, As noted earlier, the Fed sets the
dollar volumeofreserve'requirements equal
to fixed percentages ofthe various types of
deposits issued by banks, Thus ifthe Fed fixes
the quantity oftotal reserves available to the
bankingsystem, bank deposits can expand
onlyby some fixed amount. Otherwise, total
reserve requirements for the banking system
would exceed the total quantityofreserves
available to meetthose requirements, As a
consequence, some individual banks would
find themselves withoutenough reserves to
meet their requirements,
These banks might respond by bidding for
reserves in the funds market, causing the
funds rate torise, In fact, the funds rate would
haveto rise tothe level atwhich system-wide
deposits and reserve requirements fell
enough to eliminatethe aggregate reserve
deficiency, Thus, the use ofreserves to con-
trol moneygrowth doesnotreducethe role of
the funds rate in the control process, This
approach instead makesthe necessaryfunds-
rate changes an automatic result ofthe Fed's
reserves targets,
Lagged reserve accounting
With contemporaneous reserve accounting,
banks as a whole influence their current
week's required reserves through changes in
current deposits, As a consequence, the Fed
can provide a fixed quantityoftotal reserves
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(even ifthatquantity is less than current re-
quirements), and in effect, force the banking
system to adjust its currentdeposits (and thus
required reserves) accordingly,
Under lagged accounting, the link between
currentdeposits and required reserves is
broken, Banks enteranygiven week with a
predetermined orunchangeable quantityof
required reserves, Unless the Fed wanted to
force some individual banks into a defi-
ciency, itmust provide the quantityof
reserves demanded by the banking system,
Underlaggedaccounting, the Fed's supplyof
reserves must adjust to the banking system's
demand, This is justthe opposite to contem-
poraneous accounting, where banks adjust
theirdemand for reserves (through deposit
changes) to the Fed's fixed supply,
Discount window
Doesthe Fed haveanycontrol overthe mon-
etary aggregates under a system oflagged
accounting, where itmustaccommodateany
quantityofreserves demanded by banks? The
answer is yes undercertain circumstances,
which depend on the level ofreserves which
banks borrow from the Fed, The Fed has two
basic methods ofsupplying reserVes, Non-
borrowed reserves are supplied when the Fed
purchases a Treasury bill orother security
directlyor indirectly from a bank, payingfor
the security with reserves (in the form ofa
deposit at the Fed), The Fed supplies bor-
rowed reserves when it makes a loan to a
bank at the discount rate, Banks are reluctant
to borrow from the discountwindow, how-
ever, partly because the Fed has historically
discouraged such loans except in emergen-
cies, and partly because it imposes explicit
restrictions on the quantityofreserves itwill
lendtoanyonebankovertime, Thus, in view
ofbanks' reluctance to borrow, the Fed can
restrict money growth by providing a larger
proportion ofbanks' predetermined require-
mentsthrough the discountwindow,
For example, when the Fed wants to slow
money growth, itreduces its provision of
nonborrowed relative to borrowed reserves,Total Reserves
Note: Below point A, borrowed reserves equal zero, and the funds rate is
below the discount rate.
This then is an important problem with
lagged accounting: ifthe Fed needs to reduce
borrowed reserves to nearly zero, itmust ef-
fectively return to the funds-rate operating
procedure. This can Occur whenever the
funds rate is below the discount rate, as has
been the case in recent months. Thus, from a
purelymonetary-control standpoint, aswitch
to contemporaneous reserve accounting ap-
pears to be justified as anatural extension of
the Fed's October 6 actions, which involved
achange to a reserves procedure for control-
ling the monetary aggregates.
John P. Judd
funds rate could not be determined by non-
Fed participants in the reserves market be-
cause neitherthe demand for reserves nor the
supplyofreserves respond to the funds rate-
supply is unresponsive because borrowed
reserves are nearly zero, while lagged ac-
counting makes reserves demand unrespon-
sive (see chart).
Crux of problem
To avoid such extreme funds-rate fluctua-
tions, the Fed could buy the excess reserves
from banks through open-market operations
designed to set the funds rate at some desired
level. But in that event, the Fed would be
following afunds-rate approach to money
control-theapproach itabandoned lastfall.
Alternatively, the Fed could maintain the dis-
count ratelj"lowthefunds'rilte,inducinga
positive level ofborrowed reserves at all
times. But for avariety ofreasons, the Fed
historically has notchanged the discountrate






This procedure can provide for monetary
control ifbanks' reluctance to borrow is pre-
dictable, and ifthe 'aggregate quantity of .
discount-window borrowing is not close to
zero. But what happens when borrowed re-
serves are close to zero (because the funds
rate isbelowthe discount rate) and when the
Fed increases nonborrowed reserves to stim-
ulate money growth? Under these circum-
stances, banks would find themselves with
excess reserves, which they would then lend
to other banks in the funds market. This
would make the funds rate fall as excess re-
serves were transferred between banks. If
borrowed reserves were significantly posi-
tive, the funds rate would stop declining as
banks were induced to borrow fewer reserves
from the Fed, thus absorbing the excess re-
serves in the banking system. But with bor-
rowed reserves already nearly zero, banks
could notbe induced to lowerthat borrowing
any further. Thus the excess reserves in the
system would not beabsorbed until the funds
rate approached zero. In technical terms, the
Under lagged accounting, this would not
change banks' requirements for total re-
serves, which are based on the level ofde-
posits two weeks earlier-but itwould force
some banks ultimately to borrow more of
those reserves·from the discountwindow. But
since banks are reluctanttogoto the window,
they may first try to meetdeficienciesthrough
the funds market, driving this rate up relative
to the discount rate. With the increase in the
relative cost ofborrowing in the funds mar-
ket, some banks will be induced to make up
theirdeficiencies at the discountwindow. But
because ofthe rising funds rate, deposits will
expand less rapidly.SS'lfl~ J.Sl:lI::l
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loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 136,940 300 7,696 6.0
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 115,294 190 8,610 8.1
Commercial and industrial 33,204 - 106 1,819 5.8
Real estate 46,666 111 7,624 19.5
Loans to individuals 23,584 - 19 1,129 5.0
Securities loans 973 - 28 - 615 - 38.7
U.S. Treasury securities" 6,274 - 2 - 1,349 - 17.7
Othersecurities" 15,372 112 435 2.9
Demand deposits - total# 44,161 - 403 558 1.3
Demand deposits -adjusted 31,948 - 191 369 1.2
Savings deposits - total 28,719 143 - 1,969 - 6.4
Timedeposits - total# 61,534 - 81 11,492 23.0
Individuals, part. & corp. 53,262 15 11,687 28.1
(Large negotiable CD's) 22,116 113 4,966 29.0
Weekly Averages
ofDaily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess ReselVes (+)/Oefidency (-)
Borrowings
















* Excludes tradmg account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments may be addressed tothe editor (William Burke) ortothe author••..Free copies of this
and otherFederal Reserve publications can beobtained bycallingor writing the Public Information Section,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Frandsco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 544~2184.